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Article title PROTOCOL SECURITY ANALYSIS OF ELECTRONIC VOTING SYSTEM BASED ON BLIND INTERMEDIARIES WITH THE AVISPA TOOL
Authors L. K. Babenko, I. A. Pisarev
Section SECTION V. INFORMATION TECHNOLOGIES AND PROTECTION OF INFORMATION
Month, Year 07, 2017 @en
Index UDC 004.056
DOI
Abstract The development of electronic voting systems is an important problem in the modern world. Such systems are more reliable and convenient than traditional methods of voting. However, their development is much more complicated and to prove that any system is reliable at a sufficient level is also extremely difficult. In this paper, we analyze the security of a cryptographic protocol, which is used in the electronic voting system created by the authors on the basis on blind intermediaries. The protocol is analyzed at the most crucial stage of the system - voting. Protocol is described. Data transformation during interaction of the parties in the voting stage is shown. Specifications are given regarding the use of certain techniques to ensure the security of information throughout the voting stage. Cryptographic protocol security is checked at this stage. The Avispa system is used as a tool for protocol security verification. The article describes protocol in the special language CAS+, which is converted to HLPSL (High−Level Protocol Specification Language) and analyzed by this tool. Security analysis goals of the developed protocol are set, such as: parties authentication, data privacy verification, protection against replay-attacks. The description features of protocols with the Avispa tool are given. Protocol security of electronic voting system based on blind intermediaries is checked, parties’ interaction scheme is examined, including messages analysis that the attacker could intercept. The effectiveness of cryptographic protocol protection from the attackers’ actions is shown. Conclusions are drawn on Avispa tool using for protocol security analyzing.

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Keywords Electronic voting; cryptographic protocols; cryptographic protection; security verification of cryptographic protocols.
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